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Abstract 
Juvenile justice reforms in America today closely resemble the ones that occurred over a 
century ago. The reforms of both eras aim to separate juveniles from adults and 
emphasize rehabilitation over punishment. Why is policy repeating itself? In search of an 
answer, I look to a monumental series of liberal Supreme Court decisions made in the 
1960s that constituted what is now known as the Civil Rights Era’s “due process 
revolution.” In these cases, the Supreme Court provided juveniles with procedural 
protections in attempt to prevent the manifestation of racial bias in the juvenile court. It is 
commonly agreed upon that the due process revolution failed in its mission to protect 
minority youth. However, scholars are divided on why it failed. Some claim that states 
simply did not implement the protections properly. Others argue that a conservative 
backlash obstructed their proper implementation. In this thesis, I put forth that the 
decisions themselves — specifically, Kent v. United States and In Re Gault — 
criminalized youth by mistakenly presuming that racism could be regulated out of the 
court by enhanced procedures of due process. The liberal decisions made in Kent and 
Gault ultimately paved the way for the conservative carceral agenda of the late twentieth 
century and subjected minority youth to unprecedented punitive policy. I refer to Naomi 
Murakawa’s “racial innocence” theory to illuminate this interpretation of events and 
suggest that communities look inwards for alternatives to institutional reform. 
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Introduction: Today’s Reforms 
 
This past summer, while working at a nonprofit organization based in 
Washington, D.C. whose purpose is to educate and lobby for criminal justice reform, I 
learned of a supposedly ground-breaking juvenile justice reform that was about to be 
enacted in my home state of New York. Governor Cuomo had signed a bill called “Raise 
the Age” on April 10, 2017, and the first phase of its implementation was set to begin 
over a year later, in October of 2018. The provision of the bill that first caught my 
attention — probably because it shocked me — stated that it would transfer juveniles 
housed at Rikers Island to smaller facilities better tailored to the needs of youth. Juveniles 
were housed at Rikers Island, a prison complex in New York City, notorious for its 
heinous living conditions and deep culture of human rights violations. The abuse, neglect, 
and violence against the people at the infamous jail has been the focus of such increased 
scrutiny in recent years that current New York City Mayor, Bill de Blasio, has announced 
a plan to shutter the complex forever.1 I was stunned that children were housed in such a 
brutal and notorious place. The Raise the Age law states that adolescents younger than 
eighteen must be housed in “specialized juvenile detention facilit[ies]”!rather than adult 
jails.2 How could this reform have only just occurred? The bill also commits to providing 
“[a]ll 16- and 17-year-olds who commit non-violent crimes… the intervention and 
evidence-based treatment they need.”3 The treatment program that New York adopted in 
order to follow through with this provision borrows from what is known as the “Missouri 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 De Blasio Administration Unveils Plans for Borough-Based Jails to Replace Facilities on 
Rikers. (2018, August 15). 
2! New York State. (n.d.). Raise the Age. Retrieved April 25, 2019, from 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/oji/raisetheage.shtml. 
3 Ibid. 
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Model,” a rehabilitation and relationship-based method that originated at the Missouri 
Division of Youth Services in 1975,4 seemingly far ahead of the curve. The model uses 
“a therapeutic… approach focused on prevention and early intervention” for youth who 
have come into contact with the juvenile justice system more recently, and “a 
comprehensive and fully integrated treatment approach” for youth who are “at greater 
risk of reoffending.”5 This approach – treatment, rather than punishment – aligns with 
today’s more progressive values. Proponents of the bill herald it as momentous and 
indicative of substantial social change, “transforming New York City into a nationwide 
leader in juvenile justice.”6 Advocates for youth and public officials even “hailed the 
beginning of a new era in juvenile justice” in New York.7  
In fact, this “new era” is taking place across the country. Vermont, Connecticut, 
and Missouri have each passed their own Raise the Age laws in the past decade,8 and 
other states have passed other kinds of juvenile justice reforms, such as laws pertaining to 
youth detention or transfer. It is easy to read the news and feel good about the progress 
states are making in juvenile justice. However, as I read about these reforms, my 
enthusiasm turned into skepticism. Many of these changes seemed so overdue. Why did 
juvenile courts even exist before if, until now, youth were housed in adult facilities, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!The Missouri Approach - About Our History. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2019, from 
http://missouriapproach.org/history/. 
5!Ibid.!
6!Williams, Z. (2018, August 01). New York City could be a leader in juvenile justice reform. 
Retrieved April 25, 2019, from https://nynmedia.com/content/new-york-city-could-be-leader-
juvenile-justice-reform. 
7!Is New York ready for Andrew Cuomo's Raise the Age law? (2019, April 18). Retrieved April 
25, 2019, from https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/justice/juvenile-justice-2/new-york-raise-the-
age-browder-rikers. 
8!Baron, D. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2019, from http://campaignforyouthjustice.org/state-
work/state-snapshot. 
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treated similarly to adults in prison, and received similarly harsh sentences? Until 2012, 
when the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama, juveniles could 
be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.9  
Origins of the Juvenile Court 
In 1899, the Illinois Legislature passed the Juvenile Court Act, which removed 
jurisdiction over juveniles from the criminal court and established the first juvenile court 
in the United States.10 The Court functioned according to a parens patriae legal 
philosophy, meaning that it aimed to care for indigent children rather than punish them. 
As juvenile justice scholar Barry Feld explains it, parens patriae can be defined as “the 
right and responsibility of the state to substitute its own control over children for that of 
the natural parents when the latter appeared unable or unwilling to meet their 
responsibilities or when the child posed a problem for the community.”11 The invention 
of the juvenile court came about as a result of both evolving social science and the 
increasing crowdedness of industrial cities. Social scientists came to realize that “children 
are less culpable for misconduct and more amenable to rehabilitation.”12 The juvenile 
court resembled a progressive project that embodied what scholars refer to as the 
“rehabilitative ideal.” Law Professor Francis Allen characterizes the rehabilitative ideal 
in this way, illustrating that the rehabilitative ideal which shaped the very first Juvenile 
Court Act was focused on causation, treatment, and therapy: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!Miller v. Alabama (June 25, 2012) (Westlaw, Dist. file). 
10!Bernard, T. J., & Kurlychek, M. C. (2010). The cycle of juvenile justice. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press.:76.!
11!Feld, B. C. (1999). Bad kids race and the transformation of the juvenile court. New York: 
Oxford University Press.:52. 
12!!Markman, J. S. (2007). In re Gault: Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working Can It Work. Barry 
Law Review 9:126. 
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“It is assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes. 
These causes can be identified as part of the physical universe, and it is the obligation of 
the scientist to discover and to describe them with all possible exactitude. Knowledge of 
the antecedents of human behavior makes possible an approach to the scientific control of 
human behavior. Finally, and of primary significance for the purposes at hand, it is 
assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted offender should serve a 
therapeutic function, that such measures should be designed to effect changes in the 
behavior of the convicted person in the interests of his own happiness, health, and 
satisfactions and in the interest of social defense.”13 
 
At the same time, economic modernization transformed America from a “rural, 
agricultural, Anglo-Protestant society” into an “ethnically diverse, urban and industrial” 
one.14 The number of homeless children increased in industrial cities, and “As families 
migrated to urban areas seeking employment and parents began working long hours 
outside the home, children were left to their own devices.”15 The juvenile court was a 
response to the notion that juveniles should receive care from the state, rather than 
punishment, and the recognition that increasing numbers of juveniles needed care. 
The Juvenile Court Act granted the court a vast amount of discretion in order to 
determine treatment and disciplinary decisions for juveniles. The judges of the juvenile 
court were “not overly concerned with whether the juvenile really committed the 
offense,” and they made decisions based on the needs of the child.16 The decision-making 
process in the juvenile court was informal, and court records were kept confidential in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13!Allen, F. (1959). Criminal justice, legal values and the rehabilitative ideal. The Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science,50(3), 226-226. doi:10.2307/1141037:226.!
14!Feld, B. (2007). A century of juvenile justice: A work in progress or a revolution that failed? 
Northern Kentucky Law Review, 34(2):191. 
15Markman, J. S. (2007). In re Gault: Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working Can It Work. Barry 
Law Review 9:125.!
16!Bernard, T. J., & Kurlychek, M. C. (2010). The cycle of juvenile justice. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press.:125!
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order to avoid stigma.17 The Act also mandated the separation of juveniles from adults 
while incarcerated and barred jail detention for children under the age of twelve. The idea 
of a juvenile court spread throughout the United States. By 1925, every state had one 
except for Wyoming and Maine.  
Why Has Juvenile Justice Reform Repeated Itself? 
 It appears that today’s state-level reforms – particularly the provisions of Raise 
the Age laws – are not merely overdue; they echo reforms made at the very birth of the 
juvenile justice system, over a century ago. Specifically, today’s state-level initiatives to 
separate children from adults in prisons and detention centers, and to provide treatment 
and rehabilitation to children instead of punishing them, resemble the characteristics of 
the original Juvenile Courts Act. The initial aim of this thesis is to investigate why 
current reforms sound so much like those of the 19th century. Why is juvenile justice 
policy repeating itself? What has occurred between then and now?  
The Due Process Revolution 
In the first half of the twentieth century, prompted by increasing demand for labor 
in northern factories and racist “laws, customs, and extra-legal violence in the South,”18 
millions of African Americans migrated from the rural South to industrial cities in the 
North and West. The resulting social and demographic changes put racial equality and 
civil rights on the national political agenda. During the 1950s and 1960s, “the Civil 
Rights movement confronted racism and segregation in the South and demanded things 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17!McCord, J., Widom, C., & Crowell, N. (2001). Juvenile crime, juvenile justice. Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press. (2001). Retrieved April 26, 2019, from EBSCO:157 
18!Feld, B. (2017). The evolution of the juvenile court : Race, politics, and the criminalizing of 
juvenile justice(Youth, crime, and justice series). New York: New York University Press. 
(2017).:51!
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like racial equality and social justice.”19 At the same time, due to the growing Civil 
Rights Era awareness and desire to protect the civil rights of minority groups, “optimism 
about the juvenile court had broken down and a more realistic view... began to emerge. 
This view was based on an assessment of the actual performance of the juvenile court 
rather than on the good intentions of its founders.”20 For the first time in half a century, it 
became apparent that all the discretion and power granted to officials of the juvenile court 
were no longer serving their rehabilitative, problem-solving purpose.  
The juvenile court’s unchecked discretionary freedom allowed room for racially 
biased decisions. Specifically, “juvenile courts more often referred Black juveniles for 
formal processing and committed them to institutions than they did whites with similar 
crimes and prior records.”21 The juvenile court had begun to lose its unique qualities that 
were designed to protect and help indigent or troubled children. “Left-wing critics 
characterized individualized treatment as a paternalisic veneer that masked coercive 
social control and oppressed the poor, the young, and minorities… Liberals criticized 
judges and social workers whose discretionary decisions did not rely on science or 
evidence, but which resulted in unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders...”22 
And, in the words of Justice Fortas in Kent v. United States -- the first juvenile justice 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19!Ibid, 200.!
20!Bernard, T. J., & Kurlychek, M. C. (2010). The cycle of juvenile justice. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press.:95!
21!Feld, B. (2017). The evolution of the juvenile court : Race, politics, and the criminalizing of 
juvenile justice(Youth, crime, and justice series). New York: New York University Press. 
(2017):60.!
22!Feld, B. (2017). The evolution of the juvenile court : Race, politics, and the criminalizing of 
juvenile justice(Youth, crime, and justice series). New York: New York University Press. 
(2017):58.!
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case to ever reach the Supreme Court -- the “admonition to function in a ‘parental’ 
relationship [should] not [be] an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.”23   
This realization that, often times, “juvenile courts… lack the personnel, facilities 
and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae 
capacity”24  laid the foundation for the introduction of due process protections in the 
juvenile court. In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that if juveniles 
were going to be subject to punishment, they should receive at least some of the 
protections provided in criminal court.25 The Supreme Court acknowledged the reality 
that the juvenile court provided children with “neither the protections accorded to adults 
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”26  
Between 1966 and 1975, the Supreme Court made four more key decisions that 
changed the face of juvenile justice by establishing formal due process protections for 
juveniles. The result was a new, “constitutional” juvenile court that was intended to 
provide juveniles with the best of both worlds: due process protections of the criminal 
court and the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile court. In making these decisions, the 
Court aimed to “pursue racial equality and dismantle segregation.”27 However, these 
efforts to expand and protect juveniles’ civil rights ultimately failed, and actually resulted 
in increased criminalization of youth in later decades. My thesis will specifically focus on 
the most significant of the five juvenile due process revolution cases: Kent v. United 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 In Re Gault (May 15, 1967). Par. 4. 
24!Bernard, T. J., & Kurlychek, M. C. (2010). The cycle of juvenile justice. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press.: 100.!
25!Kent v. United States (March 21, 1966) Par. 27. 
26!Ibid, Par. 14. 
27!Feld, B. (2017). The evolution of the juvenile court : Race, politics, and the criminalizing of 
juvenile justice(Youth, crime, and justice series). New York: New York University Press. 
(2017):51. 
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States and In re Gault. These decisions played the most crucial role in laying the 
groundwork for legal mechanisms that would bring increasing harm to juveniles in the 
following decades. While scholars have blamed the failure of the due process revolution 
on inconsistent reform implementation and on a conservative backlash, I argue that its 
failure (to protect minority youth and amend anti-black practices) was a result of these 
liberal decisions themselves. These Supreme Court cases established mechanisms in the 
juvenile court that subjected youth to punitive sentencing policies driven by 
conservatives who portrayed them as potential “superpredators,” a phrase coined by 
political sceintist John Dilulio in the nineties, used by conservatives to scare the public 
into voting for law and order policies. Without these liberal reforms, which effectively 
cleared the way for such conservative policy, the “superpredator” caricature could not 
have driven policymaking as it did.  
 I will use Naomi Murakawa’s theory of “racial innoence” in order to illuminate 
the ways in which liberals can be held responsible for the retrogression of the treatment 
of juveniles in the juvenile justice system back to where it started a century ago. The 
addition of due process rights to the juvenile court has subjected juveniles to harsher 
punishments and created a procedural system that only renders legal institutions more 
difficult for them to navigate and more likely to decrease their life chances. It is 
important to realize that the punitive policies of the “get tough” era were a consequence 
reforms driven by well-intentioned, though misguided, liberals. No scholarship currently 
exists that investigates the reasons why juvenile justice reforms of today attempt to make 
the same changes as that of a century ago. If we view the failure of the due process 
revolution through the lens of Murakawa’s “racial innocence” theory, we can better 
!11!
understand why it failed juveniles—particularly juveniles of color—and, in some ways, 
brought us back to where we started in 1899.  
Explanation One: Exemption from the Usual Cycle 
         One camp of literature attributes the due process reform’s failure to its perceived 
exemption from the typical, inevitable cycle of reform. Thomas Bernard and Megan 
Kurlychek explain that this cycle begins with a widespread public perception that 
juvenile crime rates are unusually high, and that these rates can be lowered by more 
lenient juvenile justice policies. This results in a major reform to establish lenient policy. 
Officials subsequently toughen back up over time, as the public perception gradually 
shifts to view lenient policy as the cause of crime. Eventually, after punishments have 
grown too harsh, the public advocates for lenient policies again, and the cycle repeats.  
According to some scholars, the due process reform failed because it “fell outside 
the expected cycle of juvenile justice” – it did not conform with the conventional 
categories of either toughening or softening policy, which were the prominent political 
ways of discussing justice reform at the time. Because the application of due process did 
not clearly fit into the agendas of that political moment, it would “largely fail to be 
implemented.”28 For the public, expanding juveniles’ due process rights did not 
particularly relate to liberal nor conservative ideology, and so it fell flat; “most 
commentators shared the view of Justices Fortas and Brennan that the decisions would 
not drastically alter the basic nature of juvenile courts.”29 This theory is insufficient 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28!Bernard, T. J., & Kurlychek, M. C. (2010). The cycle of juvenile justice. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press.: 132. 
29!Manfredi, C. (1998). The supreme court and juvenile justice. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press 
of Kansas:156. 
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because it entirely overlooks the political and legal developments that did indeed occur in 
the decades following the due process revolution. There is much more to the story. 
Explanation Two: A Conservative Backlash 
         Another argument, by renowned juvenile justice scholar Barry Feld, cites a 
conservative backlash to the Civil Rights Era as the reason the due process reforms did 
not succeed. According to this theory, conservatives interpreted the social unrest 
characteristic of the Civil Rights Era as an indication of deteriorating “law and order,” 
and advocated more punitive policies.30 Liberals lacked a coherent policy alternative or 
political response to conservative proposals to “toughen up” on crime. Ultimately, this 
inability of liberals to produce a policy alternative gave way to policies that aimed to 
“crack down” on juvenile crime. Liberals who were opposed to “tough on crime” lacked 
alternatives and the public opinion held that tough on crime policies would address the 
breakdown of law and order. The due process protections did nothing to prevent the 
escalation of punitive conservative policy. As Berry Feld puts it, “Liberals had criticized 
rehabilitation as ineffective and discriminatory, lacked coherent alternatives to proposals 
to crack down on criminals, and eventually joined the law-and-order bandwagon to avoid 
being labeled soft on crime.”31 Conservatives were able to push for tough-on-crime 
policy because there was nothing to stop them. The flaw in this explanation is that it 
portrays liberals as a passive party that played no role in the formation of punitive 
juvenile justice policies; it conveys that liberals simply did not intervene. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30!Feld, B. C. (2003). Race, politics, and juvenile justice: the Warren Court and the conservative 
“backlash.” Minnesota Law Review, 87(5), 1447–1577.:1451. 
31!!Feld, B. (2017). The evolution of the juvenile court : Race, politics, and the criminalizing of 
juvenile justice(Youth, crime, and justice series). New York: New York University Press. 
(2017):107.!
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Explanation Three: Racial Innocence 
         Scholars such as Naomi Murakawa argue that liberals participated actively in the 
creation of carceral law and order policies in the 1970s and 1980s. In her book, The First 
Civil Right, Murakawa describes the nature of this sort of participation. She starts by 
explaining that liberals during the civil rights period emphasized the ways society had 
wronged black people – that blacks had been denied rights that the government owed 
them for centuries. As a consequence of this effort to perhaps sympathize and create a 
relatable perspective, liberals ultimately portrayed black people as hurt and angry, and 
therefore potentially retaliatory or violent. Conservatives feared such retaliation, which 
on its own surely contributed to calls for law and order and tough policing. At the same 
time, liberals proposed a de-racialized justice system and stronger administrative 
procedures in efforts to make a good, color-blind criminal justice system by virtue of 
uniformity and procedural fairness. This liberal “presumption that criminal justice is 
innocent of racial power until proven otherwise” is what Murakawa calls the penology of  
“racial innocence.”32 It is what led liberals to believe they could create an unbiased and 
smart-on-crime juvenile justice system by strengthening procedures and granting 
juveniles protective rights. This administrative growth, however, would ultimately only 
strengthen and empower law enforcement and punitive court actors and, “taken together, 
the liberals’ brand of racial criminalization and administrative deracialization legitimized 
extreme penal harm to African Americans...”33 In the end, liberal demands during the 
Civil Rights Era played a significant role in justifying law and order policies that are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32!Murakawa, N., & Beckett, K. (2010). The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of 
Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment. Law & Society Review, 44(3/4), 695-730.  
33!Murakawa, N. (2014). The First Civil Right!: How Liberals Built Prison America. [N.p.]: 
Oxford University Press.:18. 
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infamous for their racism today. It is crucial that we consider the susceptibility of liberal 
arguments to political cooptation, and realize the potential for well-meaning policy to do 
the opposite of what it intends or appears to do at face-value. As Murakawa puts it, 
“Aspirations and good intentions [can] not contain carceral machinery.”34 Even Bernard 
and Kurlycheck echo this sentiment, observing the effects of the new “constitutional” 
juvenile court: 
“The redefinition of delinquents as “modified” criminal defendants ultimately 
undermined the second part of the Supreme Court’s decision, which was to maintain the 
focus on care and treatment as ‘the best’ of the original juvenile court. Indeed, this very 
redefinition of the juvenile delinquent as a ‘small criminal defendant’ implies that 
juvenile justice practice should mirror the policies and practice of the adult criminal 
system – ideas that were much more in tune with the political agenda of the 1980s than 
were the notions of care and treatment.”35 
  
In other words, the decision by liberals to grant juveniles due process protections actually 
reframed juveniles as a sub-group of criminals. This was not the Supreme Court’s 
intention, but a product of racial innocence. In The Black Silent Majority, Michael 
Fortner “exposes how a network of liberal white do-gooders and bureaucrats, guided by 
professional expertise and moral indignation and aided by their reputations and 
organizational capacities, instituted and faithfully guarded”36 policies that the black 
community itself did not want; racial innocence —the assumption that the justice system 
can be improved, or made color-blind, led liberals to institute reforms that would 
ultimately hurt the people for whom they intended to expand individual rights and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34!Murakawa, N. (2014). The First Civil Right!: How Liberals Built Prison America. [N.p.]: 
Oxford University Press.:22. 
35!Bernard, T. J., & Kurlychek, M. C. (2010). The cycle of juvenile justice. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press.:133.!
36!Fortner, M. (2015). Black silent majority : The rockefeller drug laws and the politics of 
punishment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
doi:10.4159/9780674496088:21. 
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protections. Murakawa explains: “Seen as an administrative deficiency, racial violence 
could be corrected through the establishment of well-defined, rule-bound, and rights-
laden uniform state processes.” We can apply this understanding of carceral expansion 
specifically to what occurred in the juvenile justice system as a result of decisions made 
by the Supreme Court during the due process revolution: 
“As a methodology for ‘finding racism’ in the criminal justice system, liberal law and 
order reinforced the common sense that racism is a ghost in the machine...  the liberal’s 
brand of racial criminalization and administrative deracialization legitimized extreme 
penal harm to African Americans: the more carceral machinery was rights-based and 
rule-bound, the more racial disparity was isolatable to ‘real’ black criminality.”37  
 
As Murakawa describes, the Supreme Court made its decisions based on the liberal 
intention to increase fairness through the vigilant and uniform administration of 
procedural rights. Justice Fortas expresses this explicitly in In re Gault, stating that 
“[f]ailure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in 
instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or 
inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.” These due process 
reforms align definitively with Murakawa’s characterization of liberals’ racial innocence 
mentality.  
The Landmark Cases 
Kent v. United States (1966) 
 The first juvenile case ever to reach the Supreme Court, Kent v. United States, 
laid the groundwork for the escalation of punitive juvenile justice policy by solidifying 
the process by which juvenile cases could be transferred to criminal court. In this case, 
the Court had to answer the question of whether the juvenile court of Arizona had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37!Murakawa, N. (2014). The First Civil Right!: How Liberals Built Prison America. [N.p.]: 
Oxford University Press.:18. 
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rightfully waived its jurisdiction over a case involving 16-year-old Morris Kent, who had 
committed “housebreaking, robbery, and rape.”38 Before Kent, in cases where juveniles 
had committed especially heinous crimes, the juvenile court could waive its jurisdiction 
in order to send those cases to criminal court. However, Kent brought to light that the 
juvenile court sometimes waived cases without first conducting thorough investigations 
or hearings to inquire whether those cases could be waived on legitimate grounds. In 
attempt to prevent juveniles from being transferred arbitrarily, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Kent that juvenile court judges must provide a “statement of the reasons or 
considerations… sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of ‘full 
investigation’ has been met… with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.”39 
It also required that children receive a hearing, as part of a “full investigation,” in order to 
determine the validity of a waiver that would send them to criminal court to face criminal 
charges. 
In re Gault (1967) 
 
 The next year, another juvenile case reached the Supreme Court and similarly 
defined due process rights for juveniles in juvenile court that, contrary to the Court’s 
intentions, would only position them to receive sanctions similar to those in the criminal 
court. As Barry Feld states, “Gault triggered a procedural revolution that transformed 
juvenile courts from welfare agencies into scaled-down criminal courts”40 Drawing from 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the justices ruled that juveniles had the rights to notice of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38!Kent v. United States (March 21, 1966) Par. 1.!
39!Ibid, Par. 19.!
40!Feld, B. (2017). The evolution of the juvenile court : Race, politics, and the criminalizing of 
juvenile justice(Youth, crime, and justice series). New York: New York University Press. 
(2017):66. 
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charges, to legal counsel, and against self-incrimination. Justice Fortas writes in the 
majority opinion: “It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility 
that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data.”  
Kent v. United States and In re Gault were “part of the Warren Court’s larger project to 
expand civil rights, reform states’ criminal procedures, and protect minorities.”41 
Instead of attributing issues of unfairness in the juvenile court to its racism 
inherent to American legal institutions, the Supreme Court justices attributed it to a lack 
of thoroughness in the court’s truth-seeking process. According to Murakawa’s racial 
innocence theory, the Court’s remedy for racial bias will result in mechanisms that 
strengthen and formalize a carceral state. The liberalism that propels these reforms 
function as a stepping stone toward racial subordination. Mark Golub writes that “The 
problem… is that racial inequality is quite often advanced through mechanisms that 
neither violate market rationality nor require any discernible racial intent. The wrongness 
of racist policies and practices, in other words, lies not in their deviation from 
individualist ideals (discrimination), but in the systemic advantaging of one group 
relative to another (subordination).”42 The Court views racism as a problem that can be 
filtered out of legal institutions, rather than one that is inevitably entangled with those 
institutions.!Liberals celebrated the due process revolution as a major milestone in the 
direction of procedural protections for vulnerable youth, not realizing how these 
decisions would criminalize and harm youth not far down the road.  
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The Court’s Miscalculations 
Adolescents’ Competence to Exercise Procedural Rights 
 These two decisions resulted in the application of criminal rights to juveniles in 
juvenile court processes without first ensuring that those rights functioned in the same 
ways for juveniles. Specifically, Gault assumed juveniles to be “competent to exercise 
rights in an adversarial process,”43 and “made delinquency hearings more formal, 
complex, and legalistic and required youths to participate in and make difficult 
decisions.”44 Despite these significant changes, the Court did not anticipate that it should 
grant juveniles protections to compensate for their developmental differences from 
adults. It failed to consider the additional safeguards juveniles might require in order to 
successfully exercise their new procedural rights.  
For instance, most states use adult standards to gauge the validity of juveniles’ 
waivers of their Miranda rights, such as the right to remain silent or the right to speak 
with a lawyer before answering questions.45 Only about ten states recognize that most 
juveniles lack the capacity to waive their Miranda rights.46 However, “many juveniles 
cannot define critical words in the [Miranda] warning”47 and many only claim to 
understand their rights in order to avoid admitting that they do not.48 Officials such as 
police and judges are not required to probe further in order to ensure that juveniles do 
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indeed understand the meaning of the words and concepts in the waiver before they sign 
it. Studies conducted by Psychologist Thomas Grisso report that “many, if not most” 
juveniles do not understand the Miranda warning well enough to make a valid waiver.”49 
Despite these issues that make juveniles likely to waive their Miranda rights without 
understanding or intending to, “appellate courts can only overrule [waivers] if the 
decision was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.”50 This is a very high standard 
to reverse a decision made by a juvenile who is likely to have made it by mistake. 
Juveniles end up making false or coerced confessions and losing their access to legal 
representation as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s assumption that they would 
benefit the same safeguards as adults. 
Rights Drawn from the Wrong Source 
In an article written shortly after the Kent and Gault decisions, in 1967, Thomas 
Welch argues that the Court should have first ascertained the needs of juveniles in the 
juvenile court instead of determining simply which due process rights could be applied. 
Or, as he puts it, the Court did not ask whether differences between the juvenile court 
system “might call for the application of different standards of ‘due process’ from those 
heretofore applied in criminal cases.”51 Welch writes that the Supreme Court “without 
having yet addressed itself to what is the content of due process required in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings… undertook to discuss whether some due process requirements 
were applicable.”52 This approach normalized criminal procedure and assumed that it 
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would play the same protective role in juvenile court as it did in criminal court; “criminal 
procedure ‘norms’ became the model”53 for juvenile court, despite the potential 
irrelevance of those norms in the juveniles court. He predicts that the “wholesale 
importation of the Miranda case's rationale demonstrate that if the latter is literally 
applied in juvenile proceedings, the Gault decision’s premise of ‘criminal’ treatment will 
have become, without exception, a permanent fact of life as a direct result of the Court's 
pressures to conform to the criminal law model.”54 In other words, the application of 
these due process rights in juvenile court implies that juveniles will indeed be subject to 
criminal punishments, and that this conformity to criminal court procedures will imply 
the new standard for the treatment of juveniles as criminals even in juvenile court.  
In an article written nearly five decades later, Robin Sterling takes this notion 
another step further. She implicitly agrees that the Court did not sufficiently consider 
which rights children might benefit from most - especially black children - and she argues 
that instead of rooting procedural rights for juveniles in the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court should have looked to the Bill of Rights for procedural protections. She writes, “if 
the Court had been more attentive to the disparate treatment of black children in the 
juvenile justice system, then it would have been more likely to root juvenile court 
protections in the Bill of Rights.”55 She describes the racist history of the juvenile court, 
explaining that black children have been disproportionately involved in the juvenile court 
since its birth as a result of black children’s exclusion from rehabilitative agencies and 
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services.56 This was largely due to the fact that “Subjective factors like the child’s 
attitude and cooperativeness became part of the arrest decision. In 1926, juvenile court 
complaints against black children were filed more than twice as often as such complaints 
were filed against white children.”57 With this knowledge in mind - that black children 
were particularly vulnerable to biased decision-making by state officials, the Court 
should have chosen a legal mechanism that would have most effectively protected 
juveniles’ rights. Sterling states that In re Gault virtually condemned juveniles to a fate of 
further vulnerability to bias when it chose Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fairness, 
“consign[ing] the juvenile justice system to second-class status.”58  
This is because Bill of Rights protections entail “no balancing of the equities…In 
criminal cases, clad in the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Court does 
not try to divine what process is due, because the Bill of Rights prescribes it plainly 
enough.”59 While adults in criminal court benefitted from both the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Gault only granted children in juvenile court Fourteenth 
Amendment protections as the analysis for minimum due process protections. She writes 
that “Gault’s great deficiency is that it erected a flawed prototype that allowed future 
courts to turn a blind eye to race disparities in juvenile delinquency proceedings.60 This is 
particularly problematic because the Fourteenth Amendment calls for balancing tests - 
determinations of which rights trump others. This leaves room for racial bias in the 
juvenile court, as“all the factors of the Court’s due process test are subjective, 
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unquantifiable, and difficult to prioritize”61 The application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment only “exacerbated disparate treatment of children of color in the juvenile 
justice system.62 
“Get Tough” Cooptation 
 
 While the Kent and Gault decisions themselves did not intend to trigger decades 
of increasingly punitive juvenile justice policy, they cleared a path for such policies by 
establishing mechanisms that were susceptible to co-optation by conservative “get tough” 
politicians. In the 1960s, while the Supreme Court made the decisions that would 
constitute its due process revolution, “conservative Republicans decried crime in the 
streets and advocated law and order.63 This “law and order” mentality meant that the 
more social unrest conservatives perceived, the more they campaigned for harsher penal 
policies. By the 1970s, Republicans supported a war on crime, and the 1980s brought 
their war on drugs both of which used coded language to “convey a message that its 
recipients readily understood as a racial appeal while allowing them to deny its racist 
content.”64 Many of the changes brought by modernization that “contributed to escalating 
youth violence” in a newly urban, industrial society also “provided [Republicans] 
political impetus for get tough policies that transformed criminal and juvenile justice.”65  
Barry Feld writes that “Black youth homicide provided the nexus between race, 
crime, and fear that enabled the politics of crime and set the stage for… harsher 
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punishment of juveniles.”66 However, what he does not recognize is that Kent and Gault 
played a crucial role in setting that stage by introducing harsh, “get tough” era 
prosecutors to the juvenile court and by making juvenile transfer to criminal court easier 
and more common, made dispositions “offense based as opposed to offender based,” and 
imposed “blended sentences that mixed adult and juvenile sanctions.”67 In the 1990s, 
Republicans “waged a war on youth.”68 This “war” could not have occurred without the 
liberal due process reforms the Supreme Court made three decades earlier.  
The Introduction of Prosecutors 
 
In Re Gault gave juveniles the right to legal representation in court. This decision 
was made with good intentions—the justices believed juveniles should not have to 
navigate the court on their own and should have access to legal counsel. Some scholars 
even thought it was particularly important that juveniles have access to a lawyer, 
claiming that “the role of defense counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be 
strengthened”69 in light of increasingly harsh sentencing sentencing practices and 
frequent transfers to criminal court. However, the implementation of defense lawyers for 
juveniles only backfired: “After Gault gave delinquents a right to counsel, states 
introduced prosecutors to offset the lawyers’ presence. Prosecutors socialized in criminal 
courts to maximize convictions and punishment began to import those norms into 
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juvenile courts.”70 For every defense lawyer assigned to defend a juvenile, a prosecutor 
was assigned to convince the court of that juvenile’s suitability for punishment. While 
“The explicit impact of In Re Gault was to make an attorney for the accused delinquent a 
much more important part of the system… this also almost immediately made public 
prosecutors much more numerous and much more important in the juvenile court”71 
These prosecutors were not necessarily familiar with the goals or culture of the juvenile 
court. As Franklin Zimring states, “There is a basic conflict between injecting the same 
strategic priorities from criminal justice into juvenile court practice and defining the 
prosecutor’s professional role as helping to achieve the distinctive missions of juvenile 
court in a cooperative venture.”72 Oftentimes, these prosecutors were already trained and 
socialized to pursue the harshest sentences due to their preceding work in the criminal 
court.  
The impact individual prosecutors had on the outcomes of juvenile cases would 
differ significantly, depending on the prosecutor’s self-conception, which was mostly 
shaped by the amount of experience they had in the juvenile court. As Wallace Mlyniec 
states, “juvenile indigent defense systems across the country are really not systems at all; 
instead they are, [for the most part,] chaotic, under-funded, disenfranchised, county-by-
county hybrids of public defenders, appointed counsel, [and] contract attorneys, 
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[supplemented by] the occasional law school clinical program or nonprofit law center.”73 
For example, prosecutors who are more familiar with the criminal court system will be 
more likely to see themselves as responsible for enforcing strict punishments in order to 
protect the public or seek just desserts. As Franklin Zimring and David Tanenhaus put it: 
“Interchangeable and intermittent juvenile court duty will produce prosecutors who are 
socialized to adversarial criminal court norms and impose them on their juvenile court 
assignments.” They also note that “the years since In Re Gault was decided in 1967 have 
seen dramatic expansion in the prosecutor’s power in delinquency cases, usually at the 
expense of judges and probation staff.” It is clear that punitive prosecutors had increasing 
influence in juvenile court decisions despite that the prosecutorial role often did not align 
with the originally rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court. In order to address this issue, 
Zimring and Tanenhaus propose “the creation of long-term assignments to juvenile court, 
particularly if they are voluntary and career-oriented, will assure that the juvenile 
prosecutor is socialized into her role within the juvenile court.”74 However, the 
functioning of the court should not rely on the self-conception or experience levels of the 
prosecutors that go through it. The proposal to create long-term juvenile court 
assignments is simply a band-aid fix to a structural flaw.  
Increased use of the Jurisdictional Waiver 
 Even as juveniles faced increasingly harsh prosecutors in the juvenile court, the 
use of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction waiver increased and transferred more juveniles to 
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trial in criminal court, exposing them to criminal sanctions. When the Supreme Court 
decided in Kent that juveniles had the right to a hearing before being waived to a criminal 
court, it “appended to its opinion a list of criteria for judges to consider,” which state 
court decisions and statutes adopted. While these criteria were meant to ensure validity of 
transfers to criminal court, they actually empowered judges to use their own discretion in 
a variety of categories. For instance, judges were meant to consider a child’s age when 
determining whether to send the child to criminal court. In practice, this criteria actually 
“provide[d] impetus to transfer older youths” to criminal court. Judges had incentive to 
transfer them, as transfer lessened the burden on the juvenile court. Judges could also 
consider “clinical evaluations and prior interventions” in their decisions of whether to 
waive a child to criminal court, in addition to “base threat to public safety... , prior record, 
gang involvement, or weapon use.” While these factors seem relevant, judges had broad 
discretion to interpret and analyze. Feld writes, “Lists of factors like those appended in 
Kent allowed them to emphasize different variables and justify any decision.”75 The 
criteria provided by Kent opened the gate for judges to transfer juveniles even more 
arbitrarily than they did before. 
The Prosecutor Can Waive 
 In fifteen states, prosecutors—not just judges—have the power to decide whether 
a juvenile will be waived to criminal court. This is due to direct-file laws which “elevate 
prosecutors’ power at judges’ expense and create a model typical of criminal courts.”76 
Most direct-file laws do not provide any criteria to guide the prosecutors’ choice; the 
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choice comes down to the prosecutor’s personal beliefs. This is extremely problematic, 
because while prosecutors are “trained to evaluate evidence and charges, they have no 
professional expertise or non-offense information with which to decide to try a youth as a 
juvenile or adult.”77 They tend to focus on the offense, rather than the offender, and 
therefore shift the focus from rehabilitative options to punitive ones. For example, in 
Virginia, “Prosecutors… direct filed about one-quarter of eligible youths and focused on 
offense, weapons, and victim’s injury” rather than the elements that Virginia judges 
tended to consider, such as “clinical information, prior record, or culpability.”78 This 
means that the fate of the lives of young people depend upon arbitrary personal decisions 
made by non-experts who in fact have incentives to demonstrate that they are indeed 
“tough” on crime. Nationally, “prosecutors determined the criminal status of 85% of 
youths tried as adults and acted as gatekeepers to the juvenile justice system, a role 
previously reserved for judges.”79 
 Thomas Schornhorst argues that prosecutors should not take on tasks originally 
reserved for judges. Not only to prevent an obvious conflict of interest at a time when 
prosecutors have incentive to transfer, but also because the prosecutor has no way to 
know how to navigate these decisions. Schornhorst writes, “The problem of which 
[juveniles] should be waived is of such breadth and complexity, that the responsibility for 
the waiver determination was deliberately assigned to the judge of the Juvenile Court and 
not to the prosecutorial arm of the government.”80 In other words, prosecutors simply are 
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not equipped to make decisions of this kind, which is why the waiver decision originally 
belonged to experienced judges. The potential for arbitrariness or discrimination on the 
part of the prosecutor render prosecutorial direct file “contrary to the principles of equal 
protection as well as due process of law.”81 He concludes that “the prosecutor's choice 
method of waiver, even if reviewed by the trial court, is unsatisfactory and probably 
unconstitutional.”82 It is ironic that Kent v. United States, which aimed to ensure 
juveniles’ fair hearing before transfer to criminal court, solidified a waiver process that 
would allow the courts to infringe upon their due process rights. 
Blended Sentencing 
 
 States adopted blended sentences as an alternative to transfer practices, but judges 
simply ended up imposing them on “less serious offenders whom they previously handled 
as delinquents,”83 not criminal court transfers. In other words, this supposedly softer 
alternative to criminal court sanctions exposed juveniles to those same sanctions, but in 
the juvenile court. This “net-widening” phenomenon occurred because “Blended 
sentences meld delinquency dispositions with threat of criminal sanctions and provide 
longer confinement options than otherwise available in juvenile court.”84 Prosecutors 
actually used the threat of transfer to coerce youth to plead guilty to blended sentences, 
which carried harsher, criminal sanctions.85 Franklin Zimring criticized blended 
sentencing, implying that it was just another way for prosecutors to gain an upper hand in 
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the courtroom: “If the enhancement of prosecutorial power was sought and the creation 
of a structure of outcomes where plea bargaining was encouraged, then blended 
sentencing is just what the district attorney ordered.”86  
The Superpredator  
 
By the 1990s, politicians had coined the term “superpredator” to describe youth 
who were particularly vulnerable to entanglement in a juvenile justice system that, at this 
point, closely resembled the criminal one. The media and campaigning politicians 
portrayed superpredators as “dangerous… cold-eyed young killers suffering from moral 
poverty - rather than [Progressive era] images of disadvantaged youths who needed 
help.”87 Large-scale industrial change in the 1970s and 1980s that led to the loss of 
manufacturing jobs, coupled with the introduction of crack cocaine into inner cities, 
contributed to a significant rise in youth violence. However, politicians attributed the rise 
to a crisis of youth criminality - a “demographic crime bomb.”88 This was a political 
tactic intended to exploit the public’s fears and gain electoral advantage. Demonizing 
youth in this way “garnered politicians support for the wars on crime, drugs, and 
youth.”89 As the court paid increasing attention to crimes committed rather than youth 
themselves, the public eventually forgot about the original purpose of the juvenile court 
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altogether; “Defined by criminal behavior, juvenile courts highlight[ed] that their clients 
[were] young criminals and reinforce[d] public antipathy against other people’s children90  
America’s treatment of juveniles regressed back to standards of the 18th century, 
before the passing of the first Juvenile Court Act, when juveniles had no special 
protections at all. The goal that progressives set nearly a century earlier - a rehabilitative, 
parens patriae court - disappeared into the past. Policy no longer considered “the 
criminogenic conditions in which many youths live, for which they are not responsible, 
and from which they cannot escape - concentrated poverty, failing schools, dysfunctional 
families, dangerous neighborhoods, and the like - that contribute to delinquency.”91 None 
of these realities seemed to matter to the politicians running for election. They repurposed 
the juvenile court as an instrument with which to gain political support by inciting fear of 
black youth and as a receptacle for the children harmed by their policies. It is easy to 
observe conservative rhetoric of the get tough era and blame conservatives for the 
escalation of senseless, life-threatening punitive juvenile justice policies. But we must 
realize that such escalation could not have occurred without the formal administrative 
tools provided by Kent and Gault. Without the due process mechanisms they 
implemented in the juvenile court, juveniles could not have eventually been tried in court 
as the “superpredators” conservatives made them out to be. 
Conclusion 
The Temptation of Fatalism  
 So, if basic, liberal due process reforms such as the ones granted by Kent and 
Gault are susceptible to co-optation by carceral agendas, are any reforms not susceptible? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90Ibid,105. 
91 Ibid. 
!31!
What reforms will work to protect minority youth and improve their life chances? 
According to Murakawa’s racial innocence theory, racism cannot simply be sifted out of 
our legal institutions by stringent process regulations or the application of constitutional 
rights. In light of this, perhaps all reforms - no matter how well intended - are co-optable 
by carceral agendas and can only exist within the context of a white supremacist society. 
Golub writes that “racial equality will require a more fundamental transformation than 
these constraints would permit, and may in fact be unachievable within the current 
American constitutional order.” Frank Wilderson also recognizes the magnitude of such a 
transformation, calling it the “end of the world.”92 In this view, the juvenile court cannot 
be redeemed in the context of a country that has roots in white supremacy. Perhaps there 
is no such thing as a viable juvenile justice reform. We may be tempted to throw our 
hands up and surrender to the fatalism of white supremacy’s omnipresence in the United 
States.   
However, it is crucial to realize that movements of resistance to carceral, anti-
black institutions in the past have indeed succeeded in exposing the illegitimacy of those 
institutions and creating tangible change. Jordan Camp points out that “poor and 
working-class people of color have resisted the imposition of the neoliberal state from 
below. Their efforts have had global significance. When these protests are obscured, the 
state’s attempts to crush radical social movements are aided and abetted”93 (8). If we fail 
to sufficiently acknowledge these efforts and “obscure” them in doing so, then we 
invisibilify the work that has been done to dismantle racist institutions and create an 
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illusion that such work is either impossible or futile. Angela Davis writes that 
“frameworks that rely exclusively on reforms help to produce the stultifying idea that 
nothing lies beyond the prison.”94 If we shift our focus beyond the bounds of our current 
legal institutions, we may find inspiration for systems that are less cooptable and less 
rooted in America’s history of white supremacy. Mimi Kim observes that “Our failure of 
imagination [is] not rooted in a lack of examples, but rather in the devaluing of 
community-based actions.”95  
Resistance through Community Agency  
 We may create or find the most effective systems of justice by turning inward— 
and away from government institutions—to build upon the work already happening in 
our own communities. According to INCITE!, a “network of radical feminists of color 
organizing to end state violence and violence in [their] homes and communities,”96 
community-based approaches “challenge us to seriously address violence and intimate 
harms without reproducing the technologies of individualization, pathology, penalty, 
protection under the authority of heteropatriarchy and white supremacy, and 
criminalization.”97 This description of community-based approaches directly addresses 
the problems of attempting to improve our current justice systems through liberal 
reforms: these reforms, in efforts to de-racialize and de-weaponize the existing 
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institutions, will only strengthen them by increasing procedures and providing more 
resources. Community accountability, on the other hand, constitutes “any strategy to 
address violence, abuse, or harm” that “creates safety, justice, reparations, and healing 
without relying on police, prisons, childhood protection services, or any other state 
systems.”98 It avoids state involvement altogether and “reflects everyday ways of 
thinking and doing that have been practiced within communities for generations.”99 
Community-based accountability practices provide an excellent starting point for 
alternative justice systems because they occur organically, on the terms of the 
community, and utilize and strengthen pre-existing relationships and support networks.  
The Final Word 
 Franklin Zimring said that “standards of proof and defense lawyers are a major 
drawback to identifying children in need and providing them with help. If that is the 
mission of the juvenile court, then due process will be a major handicap to its 
achievement.”100 While he was correct that Kent and Gault were unhelpful, what he and 
other scholars have not acknowledged is that due process was not a mere “handicap” in 
the Supreme Court’s attempt to protect minority youth. The due process revolution was 
not just poorly implemented, as Bernard and Kurlychek propose, nor simply sabotaged by 
a conservative backlash, as Barry Feld claims; the liberal reforms themselves paved the 
way for the demonization of youth for decades to come. Murakawa’s theory that liberals 
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built prison America helps to explain why our juvenile justice system—a too often 
ignored institution—regressed to the extent that states are still undoing the damage, 
passing reform bills today that resemble the Juvenile Court Act of 1899. This 
interpretation of liberalism as a tool of racial subordination can and should inform our 
understanding of how we can best approach juvenile justice reforms (and any reforms), 
and caution us to think critically about policy that claims to de-racialize state institutions. 
We can look to our own communities to know where to start.  
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